The investigation before the Air-India disaster

"Certainly we can, with the benefit of hindsight, say that if we had immediately interviewed Parmar and Reyat after the [June 4, 1985] incident, we might have deterred the subsequent presumed bombing of Flight 182. But then, the RCMP had this option open to them as well and chose not to pursue it." -- CSIS director general, in a memo dated July 1986

March 27, 1985
At the request of U.S. authorities, CSIS begins a wiretap on Sikh militant Talwinder Singh Parmar, identified as a possible threat to India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi during a visit to the United Nations in June, 1985.

April 8, 1985
CSIS intercepts Mr. Parmar talking to Jang Singh in Germany about plans to assassinate Mr. Gandhi during a visit to the UN. CSIS dismisses the threat as idle talk.

June 4, 1985
CSIS agents follow Inderjit Singh Reyat, Mr. Parmar and an unidentified person into the woods outside Duncan, B.C., where they hear a loud explosion they believe to be a high-calibre handgun.

June 5,1985
CSIS tells RCMP on Vancouver Island about Mr. Reyat firing a gun in the woods, provides biographical information and tells police that Mr. Reyat is the registered owner of two revolvers.

June 6, 1985
CSIS tells Vancouver police about the incident in woods; Vancouver police tell the RCMP in Vancouver. CSIS advises the RCMP that a potential threat to Air-India and other Indian interests in Canada is "high," although they were unaware of any specific threat.

June 12, 1985
RCMP officers accompanied by U.S. Secret Service agents speak to Talwinder Singh Parmar and Surjan Singh Gill to let them know that authorities are aware of the alleged plot to kill Mr. Gandhi. The RCMP decides not to question Mr. Parmar about the explosion in woods because they did not want him alerted about surveillance by CSIS.

June 21, 1985
CSIS intercepts Mr. Parmar's conversation with Mr. Gill about papers and clothes. After the explosion, CSIS decides they were speaking in code. Papers = plane tickets; Clothes = explosives.

June 23, 1985
Air-India disaster, 331 dead. By this date, CSIS has already erased 139 of 193 tape recordings of the Parmar phone calls.

June 27, 1985
CSIS once again draws the RCMP's attention to bomb-testing incident.

July 9, 1985
After returning to Vancouver Island site, the RCMP decide dynamite exploded in woods, suggesting Mr. Parmar and Mr. Reyat tested a homemade bomb.

The investigation after the Air-India disaster

The police investigation after the Air-India disaster was seriously hampered by the failure of the RCMP and CSIS to share information. CSIS and the RCMP were arguing with each other for three months before CSIS allowed the RCMP to have full access to the recordings of Mr. Parmar's phone calls and notes made by translators. While negotiations continued, CSIS continued to erase tapes under administrative regulations on protection of privacy. By the time the RCMP found out that CSIS was erasing the Parmar tapes, only 54 of 300 tapes remained.

July 5, 1985
The RCMP finds out that CSIS is intercepting Mr. Parmar's phone calls but does not find out that intercepts began three months before explosions. CSIS refer to tapes before crash as information "from a reliable source."

July 23, 1985
The RCMP hears about CSIS wiretapping before Air-India disaster.

July 24, 1985
CSIS begins to give the RCMP access to some notes on transcripts of tapes but a dispute arises and CSIS cuts them off two weeks later.

Sept 6, 1985
CSIS gives the RCMP access to notes of wiretaps from June 4, 1985 but a dispute arises and CSIS revokes access 11 days later.

Sept 30, 1985
CSIS has erased about 235 tapes. They admit to the RCMP that some tapes have been erased.

Feb 7, 1986
Department of Justice formally asks CSIS to retain intercept tapes; only 54 tapes remain.

July 16, 1986
Senior CSIS official says the agency might have deterred the bombing if it had spoken to Mr. Parmar; the official says the RCMP had the same option to deter bombing and they chose not to pursue it.

February, 1996
Top RCMP Air-India task force official says Mounties could have solved the case much sooner if CSIS had retained tapes of intercepted conversations recorded between March, 1985 and August, 1985 and if CSIS had co-operated fully with the Mounties.