In his address to the United Nations Security Council last week, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said something that must have brought Russian Foreign Minister Ivan Ivanov to the edge of his seat. After claiming that Iraq harbours an al-Qaeda terrorist network headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a collaborator of Osama bin Laden, Mr. Powell dropped a little bombshell designed for Russia: "We also know that Zarqawi's colleagues have been active in the Pankisi Gorge, Georgia and in Chechnya, Russia. The plotting to which they are linked is not mere chatter. Members of Zarqawi's network say their goal was to kill Russians with toxins."

Finally, the much-anticipated Chechnya/al-Qaeda connection! The Bush administration had reportedly promised the Russians that Mr. Powell would refer to Iraqi support (through al-Qaeda) for Chechen terrorists. And the Secretary of State came through, albeit rather vaguely.

Mr. Powell offered no hard evidence to back up his claims. And few specifics. Just how many Zarqawi "colleagues" was he talking about? Three or four? Hundreds? Is this an organized effort, with financial backing from al-Qaeda, or just a small-scale plot?

No matter. It's the symbolism that counts. The United States was giving credence to the Kremlin's unproven theory that international terrorists are providing support for Chechen rebels. Under increasing criticism at home and abroad for its failure to end its brutal war -- now in its fourth year -- against the Chechens, the Kremlin has been trying to legitimize its military operations by establishing just this kind of linkage.

Whether or not he believes the linkage, Mr. Powell was trying to ensure that Russia, one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, will not stand in the way of U.S. war plans, assuming that the next report by UN weapons inspectors offers more evidence of Iraq's non-compliance.

Ideally for the United States, Russia will be persuaded to endorse a resolution authorizing military action against Iraq. If this happens, then France and China might possibly come aboard as well. But it is unlikely that the Kremlin will stick its neck out. Much as Moscow values its friendship with Washington, which promises increasing investment in Russia and economic integration with the West, it wants badly to prevent war with Iraq.

Unlike France and Germany, where there have been mass demonstrations against the use of force to depose Saddam Hussein, Moscow's opposition to U.S. plans has little to do with concerns about domestic public opinion. Despite widespread anti-American sentiment, recent polls suggest that most Russians are indifferent about war with Iraq.

The real concern for President Vladimir Putin is the damage that such a war would do to Russia's long-standing economic interests in Iraq. In 1972, Moscow and Baghdad signed a treaty of friendship that paved the way for large-scale Soviet arms sales to Iraq, as well as for the employment of thousands of Soviet experts in that country. As a result, Iraq owes Russia about $8-billion.

More recently, Russia became Iraq's largest supplier in the oil-for-food program established after the United Nations relaxed sanctions against Iraq in 1996, and is now Iraq's largest trading partner.

Toppling Saddam Hussein might significantly curtail Russia's trade with Iraq and also prevent Russia from recovering its Soviet-era debt. War would also jeopardize several billion-dollar contracts that Russian oil companies have negotiated for drilling in Iraq.

As demonstrated by his readiness to co-operate with the United States after Sept. 11, Mr. Putin can be flexible and open-minded in matters of foreign policy, but less so when vital Russian economic interests are at stake.

If there is a war, Mr. Putin clearly hopes for some U.S. commitment to protect Russia's economic interests in the aftermath. This may be why he hinted he might be open to a second UN resolution authorizing force against Iraq. His foreign minister, responding to Mr. Powell's Security Council speech, also mentioned the possibility.

But Russia sees this option as a last resort. If Moscow backs away from its insistence on more time for UN weapons inspectors in Iraq, it will probably not be until the 11th hour, when the drums of war are already beating and it has little choice but to jump off the fence.
Amy Knight, a specialist in Russian security affairs, is the author of Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors.